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Throughout his unpublished and published works alike, George Berkeley repeatedly
exclaims that finite spirits have the power to move our bodies by acts of volition. However,
given the nature of the way in which Berkeley carves the division between objective and
subjective experience, his remarks concerning our agency over our bodies in the real world
appear inconsistent. In an attempt to exculpate Berkeley from inconsistency, Sukjae Lee and
George Pitcher offer up an occasionalist interpretation of Berkeley. Their account situates finite
spirits with agency that extends to producing acts of will which either serve as occasions for God
to then actively assist in producing the corresponding ideas of bodily motions in our minds, or in
actually producing ideas of imagination. The project of this paper is to show that Berkeley bars
himself from holding a coherent account of non-divine causation in the real world, contra Lee
and Pitcher. Towards this end, I critically examine the aforementioned commentators’
occasionalist approach to elucidate Berkeley’s ontological and theological commitments —
along with the way in which we ought to interpret statements about the agency of finite spirits —
to ultimately derive a set of necessary conditions that must obtain in any attempt to reconcile
Berkeley’s seemingly inconsistent claims. I argue that these necessary conditions are jointly
irreconcilable.
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Introduction
Consider the movement of your hand in the focus of your visual field. Presumably, the
motion you notice of your hand and your wiggling fingers are direct products of your will to
move in tandem with the way in which your body responds to the commands of your mind. The
world is uncontroversially set up in such a way that, provided the circumstances are just right,1
your will to move your body results in the corresponding affects: your body moving in the way
you wished. What is comparably more cumbersome to understand is how and by what means a
mere volitional command to move originating in your mind is causally linked up with the
manifestation of its intended, perceivable effects of your moving body. Any tenable view of
human agency over the perceived motions of our bodies needs to tell a story about this
relationship.

Throughout his works, George Berkeley makes various remarks about the relationship
between the will of finite spirits and the perceived motions of our bodies that lend themselves to
apparent inconsistencies when we consider them in light of what he says about the nature of the
real, sensible world. For Berkeley, the perceived sensible ideas that make up the real world are
not up to any finite spirit; all of the ideas that constitute the real world are only passively
perceived by finite spirits exclusively in virtue of God’s will. In this way, Berkeley sharply
carves the division between the real world of sensation and ideas of imagination in terms of
involuntary and voluntary control on the part of finite spirits. On face value — with this
condition in hand — Berkeley seems to deprive himself of any account of non-divine agency in
the real world. But, Berkeley does markedly exclaim that we as finite spirits do act in the
sensible realm insofar as we are capable of moving our bodies.

1

If we are to take seriously Berkeley’s commitment to involuntariness on the part of finite
spirits as a necessary condition for objective reality along with the fact that our bodies consist of
real, sensible ideas in his ontology, Berkeley’s claim that we as finite spirits can move our bodies
either seems confused, or altogether inconsistent. In attempting to exonerate Berkeley of charges
of confusedness or inconsistency, George Pitcher and Sukjae Lee both take an occasionalist
approach to the problem that situates finite spirits with genuine causal agency over their volitions
to move which serve as occasions for God to create the corresponding sensible ideas in our
minds. Though initially compelling, reading Berkeley in this way not only conflicts with
Berkeley’s repeated exclamations throughout his works that finite spirits do move our own
bodies, but it also undermines his goals of maintaining common sense and warding off
skepticism.
The project of this paper is to show that Berkeley bars himself from holding a coherent
account of non-divine causation in the real world, contra Pitcher and Lee. Towards this end, I
critically examine the aforementioned commentators’ occasionalist approach to elucidate
Berkeley’s ontological and theological commitments — along with the way in which we ought to
interpret statements about the agency of finite spirits — to ultimately derive a set of necessary
conditions that must obtain in any attempt to reconcile Berkeley’s seemingly inconsistent claims.
I argue that these necessary conditions are jointly irreconcilable. In part one, I lay down the
relevant tenets of Berkeley’s ontology and his claims about the action of finite spirits that
together give rise to the troubling inconsistency. In part two, I explicate the occasionalist model
that is put forth as a means to show that Berkeley has a cogent account of the activity of finite
spirits held by Pitcher and Lee. In part three, I lay out what I take to be two issues that are unique
to their view that render it unsuccessful. I will then segue into the fourth and final part where I
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first take stock of the conditions that must be satisfied in order for Berkeley to have a tenable
picture of non-divine causation in the real world, and finish by presenting a few arguments
illustrating that Berkeley deprives himself of the tools necessary for holding such a picture.

Part One - Berkeley’s Apparent Inconsistency
Section One: Berkeley’s Ontological Commitments
While it is consistently maintained that spirits are the only active causes, and that ideas
are wholly passive and inert according to Berkeley, there remains a great deal of controversy
concerning the activity of spirits; specifically concerning the causal efficacy of finite spirits and
the Infinite Spirit, God, as each respectively relates to the perceived motion of our bodies. The
dust that commentators have been at pains to navigate through was ultimately kicked up by a
desire to understand the causal efficacy of finite spirits together with Berkeley’s claims about the
nature of objective and subjective experience. Berkeley tells us that the way in which the real,
physical world of sensible ideas differs from our imaginary, subjective experience lies manifestly
in recognizing which experiences we are and are not the authors of. In other words, objective and
subjective experiences are distinguished in terms of voluntary and involuntary control:
I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I
think fit. It is no more than willing and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and
by the same power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking
of ideas very properly denominates the mind active…2

2George

Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 25. Emphasis added. I will
henceforth cite any quoted passage found in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge as PHK
followed by the number of the principle that is quoted. All passages quoted from De Motu will be followed by the
number of the principle that is quoted. Any passage quoted from The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
will be referred to as 3D followed by the roman numerals I, II, or III indicating which dialogue the passage is from,
followed by the pagination as they appear in Berkeley: Philosophical Writings, edited by Desmond M. Clark. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008. All passages from the Principles, the Dialogues, and De Motu are
quoted from this text.
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Here, Berkeley points out that the minds of finite spirits are not only active, but that we can
properly denominate the mind as active by recognizing our capacity to willingly create, destroy,
and shift any idea in our own minds. Immediately following, we are told that sensibly perceived
ideas, contrarily, are not within our capacity to create, and furthermore, that they owe their
existence to a spirit other than our own:
But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived
by sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it
is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular
objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other
senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some
other will or spirit that produces them.3

I want to emphasize how Berkeley notes that “the ideas actually perceived by sense” do not have
a dependence on our will like those ideas that are not actually perceived by sense––that is,
contrastingly, the ideas that are “creatures of [our] will.” In Principles 33, just following,
Berkeley explicitly spells out the distinction between our experience of the real world of sensible
ideas, and our subjective experience of ideas of imagination. He writes that
The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of nature are called ‘real things’; and those
excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed
‘ideas’, or ‘images of things’, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be
they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or
are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of sense are allowed
to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the
creatures of the mind...4

From these principles, we find not only that our experiences of the real, objective world of
sensible things are caused by God, but also that those very ideas are more vivid, orderly, and
constant than the imaginary ideas of our own will. What is chiefly important in these passages
for the purpose of this paper, though, is that the distinction between real, sensible ideas of

3
4

PHK 29. Emphasis added.
PHK 33.
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experience, and subjective, ‘chimerical’ ideas of our imagination is that the former are
necessarily involuntary on the part of finite spirits, while the latter are direct products of our
volition. The principle can be stated concisely in the following way: involuntariness on the part
of finite spirits is a necessary condition for the objectivity of sensible ideas.

Section Two: Contestation and Defense of Berkeley’s Commitment to the Involuntariness
Principle
The involuntariness principle is not, however, universally endorsed in the literature
concerning Berkeley’s views the objectivity of ideas of experience. In his paper “Berkeley,
Human Agency, and Divine Concurrentism,” Jeffrey McDonough argues that involuntariness is
not a necessary nor sufficient condition for rendering sensible ideas real. The sufficiency of the
involuntariness principle for Berkeley is not a view that is held by myself, nor any of the
commentators that I will contend with later. There is no reason to believe that any sort of
hallucination I suffer, such as the image of the Good Bishop Berkeley himself raising an
acrimonious brow over my shoulder as I type away, for example, ought to be considered a real
idea simply in virtue of the fact that such an experience was involuntary on my behalf.
Principles of Human Knowledge passage 33 was quoted above as a means to illustrate the
multiple ways in which Berkeley carves the distinction between the real and chimerical — it
does not exclusively point to involuntariness. Notice again, that Berkeley claims that real ideas
are “more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind,” and that ideas of
imagination are “less regular, vivid, and constant.5 The strength, order, coherence, regularity,
vividness, and constancy of ideas all too clearly factor into Berkeley’s account of determining

5

PHK 33.
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which experiences are real, and which are not; it is precisely on this basis that the involuntariness
principle is not a sufficient condition.
Though McDonough is clearly right in asserting that the involuntariness principle is not a
sufficient condition according to Berkeley, his reasoning for interpreting Berkeley as not being
committed to its necessity is unconvincing. McDonough writes
That it should not be counted as a necessary condition gains force not only from the ways
in which we standardly interpret experiences of our own bodies, but also from our ability
to indirectly influence our experience of the world through the control we enjoy over our
bodies, as well as by our ability to focus and direct our attention. The fact that I can
typically determine whether I see my own hand as open or closed (since I’m the one who
typically opens and closes it), that I can avoid seeing the tree by shutting my eyes, and that
I can direct my attention to the sound of the birds and away from the noise of the traffic
does not require me to suppose that those experiences are merely subjective. Rather than
hold that involuntariness is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for objective
experience, it would thus seem more reasonable to treat responsiveness to our volitions as
one factor among many upon which we may draw in distinguishing between objective and
subjective experiences.6

Here, McDonough’s reasoning for sparing Berkeley from commitment to the necessity of the
involuntariness principle only makes use of appeals to how we “standardly interpret” the ways in
which our perceived bodies respond to the commands of our minds, what phenomenological
evidence “typically” seems to suggest, and how viewing things in this way would “seem more
reasonable” than adopting the necessity of the involuntariness principle. The task at hand is to
uncover Berkeley’s views about the distinction between objective and subjective experiences —
not, conversely, how we now understand the matter, nor what the most reasonable mode of
recourse would be in making the distinction in our present age.
McDonough does follow up by suggesting that this mode of reasoning is available to
Berkeley. He calls the reader’s attention to a portion of a passage in the Dialogues as purported

Jeffrey McDonough, “Berkeley, Human Agency, and Divine Concurrentism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy
46(4), (2008) 27.
6
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evidence: “the ideas perceived by sense, that is real things . . . have not a like dependence on our
will,” and are at any rate less “dim, irregular and confused” than “ideas formed by the
imagination.”7 Though he does not spell out precisely how it is that this quoted portion of the
Dialogues lends itself to his interpretation, I take it that McDonough is placing stock in
Berkeley’s turn of phrase “like dependence.” Presumably, McDonough is contrasting “not a like”
dependence with “no” dependence, such as to suggest that the ideas of sense have some
dependence on our will. This is surely a tempting maneuver, though suspiciously, McDonough
omits the larger context from which he picked out this portion of Berkeley’s writing.
Interestingly, Berkeley uses the turn of phrase “not a like dependence on our will” in both
the Dialogues and the Principles. If we are recast our focus to the context in which it is located
in the Principles, Berkeley immediately follows up by claiming that
When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see
or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so
likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures
of my will. There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them.8

Berkeley is clearly stating that the ideas imprinted on our senses are simply not up to us, unlike
the ideas of imagination. Similarly, the larger context of the passage from which McDonough
quoted is equally as revealing to this end. There, Philonous, Berkeley’s mouthpiece, tells Hylas
that “...the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear, and being
imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not a like dependence on our will.”9
Again we find that Berkeley is emphasizing that it is God, and God only, that imprints ideas of
reality unto our senses. McDonough, in quoting this passage, entirely omits the portion that I
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McDonough 27 quoting Dialogues 3:235.
PHK 29. Emphasis added.
9 3D. III. 235. Emphasis added.
8
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have italicized, and for his interpretation to succeed, it is clear why he chose to leave it out.10 To
drive the point home with brevity then, we ought to understand “not a like dependence” in
authoring ideas of sense as meaning no dependence whatsoever, and to this end, the necessity of
the involuntariness principle is upheld — contra McDonough. Because the success of
McDonough’s “Divine Concurrentism” model sits atop a foundation built from Berkeley not
being committed to the necessity of the involuntariness principle, and because — as I have
illustrated — Berkeley is in fact to committed to its necessity, I will not contend with
McDonough’s interpretation any further.

Section Three: Moving Our Bodies
What then are we to make of the motions of our bodies? For we certainly seem to move
our arms and legs voluntarily. In the Philosophical Commentaries, Berkeley straightforwardly
tells us that we do so: “We move our Legs ourselves. ‘Tis we that will their movement. Herein I
differ from Malbranch.”11 If we do in fact move our bodies ourselves, of our own volition, then it
appears that we cannot consider them objectively real based on the principle of involuntariness
as a necessary condition for objectivity. But, as Sukjae Lee helpfully points out in his paper
“Berkeley On The Activity Spirits,” Principles 34 “provides us with good reason to think
Berkeley did not regard the real ideas of his body and the real ideas of distinct physical objects to

In his paper “Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine Concurrentism,” McDonough argues for the conclusion that
both finite spirits and God causally contribute to our perceptions of sensible moving bodies. In order for this to be a
viable and consistent view, as McDonough is acutely aware of, Berkeley must not be committed to the necessity of
the involuntariness principle.
11 Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries (548). All cited passages from Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries
will henceforth be referenced as PC followed by the pagination that they appear in as found in The Works of George
Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, edited by Arthur Aston Luce and Thomas Edmond Jessop. London, UK: Thomas
Nelson and Sons, 1948. All passages quoted from Alciphron are also found in The Works of George Berkeley,
Bishop of Cloyne; they will be followed by the dialogue number and then the section number.
10
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differ in their causal makeup.”12 Though Berkeley’s main task in Principles 34 is to provide a
defense to the charge that all real things of nature are banished out of the world on his scheme, in
his defense, he groups our own bodies amongst trees, rivers, houses, stones, and mountains in a
list of real things that really exist just as they had before.13 So, if we are to take involuntariness
as a necessary condition for the objectivity of sensible ideas, and we are to take seriously the
claim that our bodies consist of real, sensible ideas, Berkeley does not seem to be at liberty in
claiming that we move our bodies –– as moving our bodies seemingly consists in voluntarily
authoring sensible motions of sensible ideas.

Part Two - The Occasionalist Model
Section One: The Occasionalist Reading of Berkeley’s Views about the Agency of Finite Spirits
In order to reconcile the apparent conflict between Berkeley’s ontological commitments
and the claim that we move our bodies, a number of readings have been put forth that ultimately
differ in the extent to which finite spirits can be considered genuinely causally efficacious with
respect to sensibly perceived motions. In a thoughtful and reasoned attempt to abide by the
involuntariness principle, one may attribute full causal efficacy over the perceived motions of
our bodies along with all the other real ideas in the sensible realm exclusively to God. The model
I wish to lay out and examine henceforth, a view that does just this, is ultimately an
amalgamation of Lee’s, and Pitcher’s views on the matter; a view that I take to be the most
prevalent and compelling in the debate.

Sukjae Lee, “Berkeley On The Activity Of Spirits,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (3), (2012)
17.
13 PHK 34.
12
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This view, which I will call the occasionalist model, attributes genuine agent activity to
finite spirits only insofar as we have “the power to produce volitions, the act of willing itself…
[and] the power to produce our ideas of the imagination.”14 Our volitions to move, so both Lee
and Pitcher argue, serve as occasions for God’s divine active assistance in producing sensible
bodily movements in us. A bit needs to be said about what I am calling “God’s active assistance”
before moving on. The “active assistance” of God, as I will be using the phrase throughout,
simply amounts to God noticing our wills and subsequently creating the corresponding sensible
effects in our minds. With respect to the sensible ideas we perceive, in the Philosophical
Commentaries, Berkeley writes that “Those things that happen from without we are not the
Cause of therefore there is some other Cause of them i.e. there is a being that wills these
perceptions in us.”15 The being that “wills these perceptions in us,” as we have seen, is God. So,
if we are to understand willing as an active enterprise for Berkeley — a notion that will be
discussed at more length shortly — God is active whenever he implants ideas in our minds. It is
in this sense, following our volitions, that God actively assists in producing the ideas of moving
bodies in our minds.
It is massively important to stress that on the occasionalist model, our volitions to move,
as mere occasions, are entirely causally inert. This is to say, in other words, that they do not
cause God to then arouse in us the ideas of our moving bodies that we intended as effects. Our
volitions are nevertheless, despite their futility towards their end in their own right, enough to
render finite spirits active beings. Lee puts this point in the following way:
we have the power to produce volitions, and this power comprises the inner core of our
activity in such a way that, even if we were to possess just these powers, we would be
genuinely active in virtue of them.16
14

Lee 2.
PC 499.
16 Lee 27.
15
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These acts of volition, as Pitcher notes, “are enough to make the [finite spirit’s] mind a genuinely
active entity” simply in virtue of the fact that we, as finite spirits, are able to bring them about
ourselves.17 Though the passage is not made use of by Lee nor Pitcher, Philonous’ exchange with
Hylas in the Dialogues book II, passage 196 lends itself immensely to their considered views
concerning this point:
Philonous: When is the mind said to be active?
Hylas: When it produces, puts an end to, or changes anything.
Philonous: Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything but by an act of the
will?
Hylas: It cannot.
Philonous: The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions, so forth as
volition is included in them.18

According to the account espoused by Lee and Pitcher, genuine agent activity consists in the
capacity to bring about changes without external causes. It is precisely in light of this condition
that finite spirits have not got the power to bring about sensible states in the real world — they
require God’s active assistance, an external cause. The power to bring about our volitions as
finite spirits, conversely, require only that we are able to do so on our own.
Concerning himself with the means by which a mere volitional command originating in
the mind of a finite spirit is associated with the ideas of our sensibly perceived moving bodies,
Pitcher paints a nice, promising, occasionalist picture on Berkeley’s behalf:
God, being omniscient, and thus knowing that I will my arm to move in a certain way,
produces in any suitable observers (including myself) ideas of sense that answer to the
intended arm-movement. I am, my volitions are, therefore merely the occasional cause of
the voluntary movements of my body, not their real or true cause.19

George Pitcher, “Berkeley of the Mind’s Activity,” American Philosophical Quarterly 18(3), (1981) 17.
3D.I.196.
19 Pitcher 2. Emphasis added.
17
18
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Lee, towards the same end, discusses the apparent regularity between our volitions to move and
their intended effects. He tells us that
the regularity is not grounded in any real causation between our volitions and their effects.
Rather, the regularity is grounded in divine causality, which treats our volitions as
occasions for the production of the ideas of sense. The lack of real causal power of ideas
of bodily parts accounts for why, despite our willing our bodily parts to do certain things,
they don’t. It is because our volitions are but occasions for God to will certain sensible
ideas when appropriate––that is, God implements the occurrence of sensible ideas, if doing
so conforms to or is consistent with the laws of nature.20

These two passages vividly reflect the relevant tenets of the occasionalism they want to attribute
to Berkeley: not only are the volitions, which are at heart, that which comprises the activity of
finite spirits, but that those volitions — that is, the volitions that aim at bodily motion — are not,
in any way ‘real’ causes. For if they were more than occasional causes, that is, more than
pitifully impotent causes on their own, finite spirits could be said to be actual contributors to
states of affairs in the real world, which as we have seen, seemingly conflicts with Berkeley’s
ontological commitments.
I think it is important to highlight what Lee tells us in the last sentence of the passage just
quoted. For Berkeley, he stresses that in order for our volitions to move to be answered by God,
they must be in accord with the pre-ordained, “set rules or established methods”21 of God — that
is, the laws of nature; only in those cases are they then appropriate occasions for God to cause
certain, corresponding sensible ideas in us. With careful inspection, we can find some evidence
for Berkeley’s purported adoption of the view that finite spirits depend upon God to produce
corresponding sensible ideas to our volitions. In De Motu 25, Berkeley tells us that
we have learned from our own experience that there is a power of moving bodies in
[thinking things], since our mind may at will initiate or stop the movement of our limbs,
however that is eventually explained. It is certainly established that bodies are moved at
20
21

Lee 27. Emphasis added.
PHK 30.
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the command of the mind, and that the latter can be called appropriately a principle of
motion––a specific and subordinate principle indeed, which itself depends on the first and
universal principle.22

In the same vein, in Principles 147, Berkeley writes that
The will of man hath no object, than barely the motion of the limbs of his own body; but
that such a motion be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly
on the will of the creator.23

The occasionalist interpreters suspect that from these passages, Berkeley is pointing out that
although the will of finite spirits apparently have the motion of their bodies as an effect, strictly
speaking, they do not have sensible ideas as their proper effects. The will of finite spirits are
nonetheless related to the actual motion of sensible ideas only insofar as they are principles to
produce occasions for the will of the Creator to actively assist in the production of such ideas.
This interpretation places heavy stock in the way in which Berkeley makes use of the term
‘dependence.’ The will of finite spirits, in this context, though they are in a loose sense
“principles of motion,” are subordinate principles which are wholly dependent upon God.

Section Two: The Upshots of the Occasionalist Model
To shift gears, I will now attempt to address the ways in which the occasionalist model
appears to be both a “coherent and interesting”24 account of Berkeley’s views about the activity
of finite spirits. One of the strengths of the occasionalist account actually derives from what
could be initially presented as an objection to the view. Situating God as the sole agent over
every state of affairs in the sensible realm effectually demarcates him as He who causes sinful
states of affairs. He is, in this sense, the ‘author of sin.’ Such a conclusion presents a very real

De Motu 25. Emphasis added. The “first and universal principle” being God.
PHK 147.
24 Lee 2.
22
23
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implication for Berkeley’s theodicy, and it seems as though Lee and Pitcher have a serious
problem on their hands.
Sukjae Lee explicitly addresses this implication of his reading head on in the final section
of “Berkeley on the Activity of Spirits.” As he puts it,
If we only cause our volitions and imaginary ideas, the worry is that this ‘activity’ seems
far from sufficient to provide the kind of robust ground for holding that it is our actions
which ‘the pain and uneasiness in this world are pursuant.’ In other words, could the mere
act of willing itself be rich enough for a theodician account that relies on the actions of
finite spirits to account for certain evils in the world?25

To save his occasionalist interpretation from the throes of a damaged Berkelian theodicy, Lee
directs our attention back to the passage in the Dialogues where Hylas presses this very charge
unto Philonous. There, Philonous states that
sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the
internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion.26

Given that finite spirits, on the occasionalist account, have control over our volitions, and that sin
— as clearly stated here by Berkeley — “consists of” deviant willing (rather than the ensuing
sensible bodily motions), Lee concludes that we, and not God, are the authors of sin.
There is textual support for the essential relationship between genuine agent activity and
agent responsibility in Alciphron:
It should seem, therefore, that, in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any person is
esteemed accountable simply as he is an agent… I know I act, and what I act I am
responsible for. And, if this be true, the foundation of religion and morality remains
unshaken.27

Despite the fact that God is the sole cause of all of our sensory perceptions, some of those ideas
are “but immediately under the direction of [our] own wills”, and this “is sufficient to entitle

25

Lee 30.
3D.III.237.
27 Alciphron 7:19.
26
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them to all the guilt of [our sinful] actions.”28 In an exchange with Samuel Johnson, who charges
him with engendering the conclusion that God is the author of sin, Berkeley retorts by writing
As for guilt, it is the same thing whether I kill a man with my hands or an instrument;
whether I do it myself or make use of a ruffian. The imputation therefore upon the sanctity
of God is equal. Whether we suppose our sensations to be produced immediately by God,
or by the mediation of instruments and subordinate causes, all which are His creatures, and
moved by His laws.29

From these passages, we get both a pretty clear defense of the notion that God is not the author
of sin, insofar as sin consists in the “internal deviation of the will” taken in tandem with the fact
that the deviation of the will is something that finite spirits have genuine control over.
A second point in favor of the occasionalist model is that it sits cozily with Berkeley’s
commitment to the involuntariness principle. To bring this to light, we need only bear in mind
that by way of rendering finite spirits entirely void of causal contribution in the intended effects
of our volitions to move, it clearly follows that we play no voluntary role in authoring ideas of
sensible moving bodies. Given that we simply play no role at all whatsoever in bringing them
about, the occasionalist model satisfactorily abides by Berkeley’s involuntariness principle.

Part Three - The Incongruence and Inimical Nature of the Occasionalist Model

Section One: Statement of the Occasionalist Reading’s Shortcomings
Despite its ability to answer the author of sin problem as well as avoid inconsistencies
with the involuntariness principle, the occasionalist model faces a few unique problems of its
own. The occasionalist model, so I will argue in this part, does not provide us with Berkeley’s
views on the activity of finite spirit that is to be “both coherent and interesting despite the
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various texts that seem rather incongruent” as Lee suggests it ought.30 The occasionalist
interpretation of Berkeley put forth by Lee and Pitcher fails on two fronts. Firstly, it fails to take
adequate consideration for the plentitude of passages where Berkeley clearly indicates that finite
spirits do, contrarily, have some degree or other of real causal agency over sensibly perceived
bodily motion. I of course do not mean to suggest that these passages are utterly and wholly
unmentioned by Pitcher and Lee, but rather that I find the ways in which they endeavor to skirt
them to be unsatisfying. Secondly, their account of that which comprises genuine agent activity
for finite spirits is pernicious to Berkeley’s intention to preserve common sense and repel
skepticism.

Section Two: Textual Incongruence
Concerning the first problem with the occasionalist model, I will lay out each passage
where Berkeley explicitly claims that finite spirits do move our bodies via our wills, and take
them in turn dialectically with Lee’s and Pitcher’s readings. One such passage has already been
called to attention, namely, the passage from the Philosophical Commentaries, where Berkeley
exclaims that “We move our Legs ourselves. ‘Tis we that will their movement. Herein I differ
from Malbranch.”31 Lee equates this claim to be merely a text from Berkeley’s early notebooks,
and as such, he adds that “there is the general question of how seriously we should take
Berkeley’s remarks in these entries as indicative of his mature, well-thought out views.”32 Given
that Lee spends no more time beyond that which I have just quoted answering the question he
has posed outside of explaining away the sense in which Berkeley takes himself to differ from

30

Lee 2.
PC 548.
32 Lee 4.
31

16

Malebranche, I take it that he believes this claim to be immature and not well-thought out. So
much might be convincing if it were not the case that Berkeley, in his ‘mature works.’ explicitly
states that we do, in fact, move our bodies. In the Three Dialogues, Philonous tells Hylas that
In plucking this flower, I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was
consequent upon my volition; so likewise to applying it to my nose. But is either of these
smelling?33

Just following, Philonous follows up by exclaiming that in smelling the flower via breathing it in
“is the effect of my volition.”34 Here we get a pretty blatant case of Berkeley making it clear that
firstly, in accord with what the occasionalist model indicates, we are active in virtue of our
volitions, but also, and towards the occasionalist model’s implausibility, that the motion of our
bodies is consequent upon our volitions.
Pitcher does attempt to address this passage in the Dialogues by claiming that Berkeley is
….speaking loosely here, for he is simply trying to make the point that our wills have more
to do with the making of bodily movements than they do with the actual perceiving of sense
impressions. Thus he might well mean that my volition is the occasional — not the real —
cause of my plucking the rose, of my applying it to my nose, and of my drawing air in
through my nose, but that my will plays no further part at all in my perceiving the delicious
smell of the rose.35

It is entirely unclear to me from the passage under consideration in the Dialogues that Berkeley
“is simply trying to make the point that our wills have more to do with the making of bodily
movements than they do with the actual perceiving of sense impressions” as Pitcher insists. It
appears that Pitcher’s statement merely dances around what is actually at stake here: whether or
not bodily motions are true effects of our volitions. Pitcher’s view is committed to the notion that
the motions of our bodies are merely subsequent upon our wills, but here Berkeley explicitly
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states that they are consequent upon them. This suggests, fairly vividly in fact, that we produce
them.
Additionally, what reason do we have to suppose that Berkeley is speaking loosely here?
Why be incredulous when Berkeley is giving a detailed and methodological account of how it is
that we are active, and how it is in other cases that we are not? When we are told that the motion
of my hand in plucking a rose is consequent upon my volition, and that breathing it in (a sensible
motion) is too an effect of another volition of mine, we can confidently gather that we have
“more to do” with the making of bodily movements than merely providing occasions for God to
do his work. As such, Pitcher’s reading of this passage evades the task at hand.
Perhaps the most glaring passage to the effect that finite spirits actually causally
contribute to the motions of our bodies is one that I have already partially quoted earlier in
addressing the mode by which the occasionalist model is immune to the ‘author of sin’ problem.
Taking notice of the larger context, we observe that Philonous tells Hylas that
… I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies.
It is true, I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent
with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited
powers, ultimately derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own
wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.36

Pitcher points out that this passage apparently tells us that God has delegated a certain degree of
causal power over the motions of their bodies to finite spirits. Correctly, Pitcher writes that this is
an implausible view for Berkeley to hold, and one that he could receive only the “the lowest
marks for.”37 Pitcher makes an effort to recast this passage in a way that is in accord with the
occasionalist model by suggesting that we look back to the passage in De Motu which tells us
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that the principle of motion that we do enjoy is subordinate to the “first and universal principle”
— God.38 Conglomerating these two passages, as Pitcher would have it, tells us that the power
we are delegated by God is merely, again, the capacity to will occasions for God to then do his
business.
I do not take it that the aforementioned move by Pitcher affords him the conclusion he
draws. What is clear from the passage from the Dialogues in question is that finite spirits
produce some motions in bodies — it is not only God that produces them. Reverting our
attention to Berkeley’s claim in De Motu that our efficacy is dependent upon God only tells us
that we would not be able to be efficacious ourselves, absent God’s good graces. That which falls
out of these passages taken in tandem is not the conclusion that we as finite spirits play no real
causal role in producing sensible bodily motions, but rather that our causal contributions,
together with God’s, produce some motions in bodies. The simple fact that we are a real part of
the causal story is enough for Philonous to tell Hylas that God is not the only agent that produces
all the motions in bodies.

Section Three: Destroying Common Sense
Not only is the occasionalist reading problematic inasmuch as it conflicts with numerous
textual passages, it entirely dismembers Berkeley’s aim of maintaining and justifying common
sense. As per common sense, willing is a sufficient condition for bodily motion for able-bodied
agents in normal, natural circumstances; when we will that we wave our hand, lo: our hand
moves as a direct result of our will. Berkeley asserts in enough instances to make it clear that
finite spirits act in the real, sensible world, and, as a matter of fact, he has to in order to uphold
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one of the features that he takes to be so appealing about his immaterialist project: that it accords
with common sense, and as such, wards off skepticism.
By committing Berkeley to a view of the agency of finite spirits that tells us that we are
simply mistaken altogether when we believe that our bodies move because we willed them to,
one of our most basic beliefs is thrown to the wind, and skepticism concerning that which our
senses tell us lurks eerily in the shadows. Though, an occasionalist interpreter, while agreeing
that Berkeley sought to maintain common sense, might contest that he would not espouse a
particular view that he believes is patently false simply for the sake of making his views appear
agreeable to ‘the vulgar.’ After all, though he wants to “speak with the vulgar,” he professes that
we ought to “think with the learned.”39 In line with this, one might follow up by stating that
Berkeley, in all of the instances where he apparently tells us that we do move our bodies, is
simply ‘speaking with the vulgar,’ but really, he does not mean it. We are, in these cases, getting
clean cut examples of Berkeley speaking with the vulgar and thinking with the learned.
I am not moved by such arguments for the following reason: as we have seen, Berkeley
makes statements about our capacity to move our bodies as consequence of our wills in
numerous instances. I might be tempted to buy into the idea that Berkeley, in these plethora of
cases, is merely speaking with the vulgar if we had sufficient reason to believe that his meaning
— in each case — could be cashed out in ways that lend themselves to an occasionalist
interpretation. I have illustrated in the previous section of this part that such a project fails.

Part Four - Berkeley’s Irreconcilable Commitments

Section One: Taking Stock
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We are now in a place to evaluate the constraints that must apply to any tenable account
of the agency of finite spirits in the objective, sensible realm for Berkeley. Firstly, we know that
it is God exclusively who authors any sensible state of affairs in the objective, sensible realm.
This condition is given to us by the necessary involuntariness principle on behalf of finite spirits.
For any sensible idea to be considered real, it must be authored by God, and God only — finite
spirits, necessarily, cannot play any voluntary role in authoring real, sensible ideas. Finite spirits,
as we have seen, have only got the direct capacity to author ideas of imagination. This constraint
apparently deprives Berkeley from any account of non-divine causation in the real world. Yet, as
we have seen, Berkeley explicitly claims that finite spirits do indeed move our bodies.
If we are to consider our bodies to be conglomerates of real, sensible ideas for Berkeley,
together with his repeated emphasis that we do move our bodies, Berkeley must think that finite
spirits’ agency extends into the real, sensible world in some sense. Considering Berkeley wants
to equate his views as closely as possible to common sense — and thereby slash the threat of
skepticism, to rob finite spirits of the capacity to move our bodies would undercut those very
goals. Lastly, Berkeley’s theodicy must remain intact; God must maintain his divine attributes.
What has been stated can be summarized into three necessary conditions that any tenable account
of the agency of finite spirits in Berkeley must satisfy: (i) the perceived sensible ideas of the real
world must be authored by God exclusively — they are involuntary on the part of finite spirits,
(ii) finite spirits must have the capacity to move their bodies in some sense, and (iii) Berkeley’s
commitment to keeping God as an omnipotent and beneficent centerpiece in his immaterialist
project must remain intact.
While I am sympathetic to the occasionalist model propounded by Pitcher and Lee on the
basis that it satisfies the involuntariness principle, (i), and that it escapes the grips of the ‘author
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of sin’ problem — satisfying condition (iii), it throws Berkeley’s commitment to condition (ii)
into the rocks. By stripping finite spirits of the capacity to be genuinely causally efficacious over
the perceived sensible motions of our bodies, the occasionalist model not only conflicts with
Berkeley’s claim that we do in fact do so, but it also bears an uncanny resemblance to a
Malebranchian picture of causation. Such a picture takes God to be the sole efficient cause of all
events. In line with the occasionalist model, if we are to consider all states of affairs in the real
world as being such in virtue of God’s making alone, then finite spirits have no genuine causal
efficacy over those very states of affairs — and this is the exact picture Malebranche endorses.
But, as we have seen, following his claim that we do move our bodies ourselves, Berkeley
explicitly states that he differs from Malebranche. In what is to follow, I will cash out what I see
as the only possible reconciliations of conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) in light of what has been
illuminated by the occasionalist model’s shortcomings. After each construction, I will argue that
each, in turn, will not do for various reasons.

Section Two: A Possible Avenue: Bodily Motions’ Dependence on both Finite Spirits and God
Any account of Berkeley’s views about the nature of non-divine causation in the real
world would be faced with the herculean task of telling a convincing story about how conditions
(i) and (ii) can be jointly satisfied. Reconciling these two conditions specifically appears to be
the most cumbersome. That is, one must be able to reconcile the claim that no finite spirit can
play any voluntary role in authoring any state of sensible affairs in the real world with the claim
that we as finite spirits do have some capacity to move our bodies. Having learned that our
activity as finite spirits consists in volitional activity, but also that this capacity — on its own —
is insufficient for the project at hand, let us grant that our volitions are efficacious in moving our
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bodies. As we have seen, we cannot be efficacious on our own; that is, we cannot be the ones
who ‘author’ the sensible ideas of moving bodies. What then are we left to be able to do?
The only remaining option appears to suggest that both finite spirits and God causally
contribute to the production of sensible bodily motions, but that God is the immediate cause of
our sensible ideas of moving bodies. According to this construal, our volitions are not mere
impotent occasions, but they really do causally contribute insofar as they are necessary in the
causal chain leading up to God actively assisting us in authoring perceptions of bodily motions.
Given that it is not finite spirits who ‘author’ the ideas of bodily motions, but nevertheless
contribute to them being brought about by provoking a separate agent who does — God — it
appears that conditions (i) and (ii) have been satisfied. Unfortunately, due to the way that this
construction fits together with Berkeley’s views about causation, it runs into inconsistency with
condition (iii): God’s omnipotence is undermined.
To see how this results from the foregoing attempted reconciliation of conditions (i) and
(ii), we must consider what type of causal role we as finite spirits could play at all in the
production of bodily motion if it can only be God that authors the sensible ideas that constitute
them in our minds. But first, Berkeley’s views on what counts as a cause must be unearthed. It
has already been established that genuine activity consists in willing, and if we look to
Berkeley’s remarks in Principles 25 and 26, we find that only spirits can be causes. There, to the
end that “ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive” are inactive, Berkeley notes that
there is “nothing of power or agency included in them” because they “cannot produce or make
any alteration.”40 In Principles 26 immediately following, we are told that because ideas
themselves are inert and void of power, “There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon
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they depend, and which produces and changes them,” and additionally, because “this cause
cannot be any quality or idea… It must therefore be a substance.” Just later, Berkeley points out
that because there is no corporeal or material substance, the “cause of ideas is an incorporeal
active substance or spirit.”41
From the foregoing, Berkeley makes it clear that only active spirits can be properly called
causes. Given that activity consists in willing, we know that volitions — as that which renders
spirits active — have to be the source of that which is considered a genuine cause. However,
volitions, considered on their own (as was made evident by the occasionalist model) can be
impotent in ‘producing’ anything. Clearly then, causes must be a species of volitions (which are
themselves the genus of activity). As Kenneth Winkler points out in his paper “Berkeley on
Volition, Power, and the Complexity of Causation,” Berkeley’s views concerning the
relationship between mere volitions and causations appears only in his unpublished notebooks.42
In the Philosophical Commentaries, Berkeley distinguishes between ‘power’ and volition in the
following way:
There is a difference betwixt Power & Volition. There may be volition without power. But
there can be no Power without Volition. Power implyeth volition & at the same time a
Connotation of the Effects following the Volition.43

Here, in conjunction with the aforementioned passages in the Principles, we can infer that a mere
volition is to be distinguished from a cause on the basis that causes are volitions that have
‘power’ insofar as they are followed by their effects. Berkeley makes the same point earlier
explicitly using the word ‘cause’ instead of ‘power’ by stating that
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What means Cause as distinguish’d from Occasion? Nothing but a being wch wills wn the
Effect follows the volition.

In this context, if we are to understand an ‘occasion’ as a volition, we can decisively denominate
causes as volitions which actually produce effects. On this basis, in order to distinguish a cause
from a mere volition, it is necessary that the former are followed by their effects. Otherwise, we
would have no other mode by which we could say the two differ.
In his book Berkeley: An Interpretation, Winkler offers what I take to be a concise
account of Berkeley’s views about causality that perfectly captures that which I have just laid
out. Recall that only volitions can be the source of anything that is considered a cause, and that in
order for a cause to be distinguished from a mere volition, it is necessary that it is followed by its
effects. Winkler frames these conditions illuminatingly and helpfully in the form of the following
biconditional:
An event counts as a cause if and only if
(a) It is followed by another event (its effect);
(b) Supposing only that God’s decrees remain the same, an event of the first type must be
followed by an event of the second type; and
(c) The first event is a volition.44

The clause in (b) that states “Supposing only that God’s decrees remain the same,” needs to be
unpacked. God’s decrees, as I will henceforth interpret them in this context, amount to His preestablished rules and laws that govern nature and all of its constituents. Understood in this way,
(b) then tells us that a volition that is consistent with the laws of nature (as they are now) must be
followed by an event of the second type (its effect). So, our volitions count as causes if and only
if they are followed by their effects, and they are consistent with the laws of nature (as they are
now) such that they must be followed by their effects.
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Now that Berkeley’s views about what counts as a cause has been fleshed out, we can
retrace our steps back to what type of causal role finite spirits could actually play in the
production of bodily motion according to the foregoing construction. Considering that bodily
motions cannot be the direct effects of our volitions, and that we require God’s active assistance
in actually authoring them, the effects of our volitions to move must consist in God omnisciently
taking notice of our wills to move and actively assisting accordingly.
In the case of bodily movements then, we are genuinely causally efficacious if and only if
our volitions to move are followed by God actively assisting in producing sensible bodily
motions in us, and they are consistent with the laws of nature (as they are now) such that they
must be followed by God actively assisting in producing sensible ideas of bodily motion in us.
With this in mind, notice that we can infer two conditionals from this biconditional:
(1) If finite spirits are genuinely causally efficacious in our volitions to move, then our volitions are
followed by God’s active assistance in the production of sensible bodily motions, and they are
consistent with the laws of nature (as they are now) such that our volitions must be followed by
God’s active assistance in the production of sensible bodily motions.
(2) If our volitions are followed by God’s active assistance in the production of the sensible bodily
motions, and our volitions are consistent with the laws of nature (as they are now) such that God
must actively assist in the production of sensible bodily motions, then spirits are genuinely
causally efficacious in our volitions to move.

In (1), part of the consequence of attributing genuine causal efficacy to finite spirits in
our volitions to move is that our volitions are consistent with the laws of nature (as they are now)
such that they must be followed by God’s active assistance in the production of sensible bodily
motions. Given that “an event of the second type” on this account just is God’s active assistance,
it follows that it is necessary that our volitions be followed by God’s active assistance in the
production of their sensible bodily motions when finite spirits are attributed genuine causal
efficacy. So, in this way, it appears that God is subservient to the will of genuinely causally
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efficacious finite spirits — He must create the corresponding sensations in us, and that is
certainly a conclusion that undermines God’s omnipotence, and something that would thereby
conflict with Berkeley’s theological commitments.
One may be drawn to press back on this on this point in a few ways. I will lay out each
rebuttal and address them in turn. One might claim that I have mistakenly inserted “God’s active
assistance in the production of sensible bodily motions” for “an event of the second type” that
necessarily follows a causally efficacious volition where, instead, I should have merely said that
“an event of the second type” is actually just “sensible bodily motions.” By reconstruing an
“event of the second type” as “sensible bodily motions,” God is in no way bound by necessity to
our volitions. So much is surely true. Unfortunately, this reinterpretation omits God’s necessity
in the production of sensible bodily motions entirely. In fact, it tells us nothing about the causal
story we were after in the first place; that is, how a mere volitional command to move originating
in the mind of a finite spirit is causally linked-up with the manifestation of sensible bodily
motions. All we get, here, is that a causally efficacious finite spirit’s volition to move is sufficient
for producing sensible bodily motions in our minds. Clearly, this is an unsavory consequence. As
we have seen, if finite spirits’ volitions are sufficient for producing sensible ideas of bodily
motion, the involuntariness principle is breached.
This construction sought to provide a causal story about the relationship between finite
spirits’ volitions to move and the sensible motions of our bodies by appealing to how it is — in
virtue of God’s role in this relationship — that Berkeley avoids inconsistency with his
ontological commitments. If one were to press back in the way previously illustrated, they would
effectually be impaling their view on the pike of the very issue that they were trying to resolve in
the first place: whether the involuntariness principle can remain intact while also maintaining
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that finite spirits play a role in the production of sensible bodily motions. This was achieved by
the claim that God notices the will of finite spirits and, consequently, He arouses in us the
motions we willed. One might stop me here and suggest that I am committing the post hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy. To entertain this thought, all I propose is that we consider what would result
from claiming that God does not consequently respond to our wills, but rather subsequently does
so. If God subsequently responds to our wills to move, which is to say that He did so through no
causal connection, it follows that it is in virtue of His will alone that we perceive sensible bodily
motions. The will of finite spirits, then, are bereft of causal contributions altogether in the
motions of our bodies — there is virtually no sense in which we move our bodies; this is the
occasionalist picture exactly.
It also might be objected that God’s omnipotence is not, contrarily, undermined by the
foregoing argument — insisting that God, on a ‘proper’ interpretation of Berkeley’s scheme,
nevertheless has the capacity to refuse or ignore the will of finite spirits. This is not something
that I think bears any contention. He surely can, even in light of the argument I am propounding.
Be that as it may, if He were to not actively assist in the production of sensible bodily motions
following our volitions to move, we simply would not be able to say we are causally efficacious.
This falls out of not satisfying both the first and second conjuncts in the consequent of
conditional (1):
(1) If finite spirits are genuinely causally efficacious in our volitions to move, then our volitions
are followed by God’s active assistance in the production of sensible bodily motions, and they are
consistent with the laws of nature such that our volitions must be followed by God’s active
assistance in the production of sensible bodily motions.
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In every case, then, that God opts not to actively assist in producing sensible bodily motions in
us, we are stripped of causal efficacy. Nevertheless, in any instance that we are attributed causal
efficacy in our volitions, God still must actively assist.
Here we find ourselves at a bit of an impasse concerning God’s will. Perched atop the
precipice of the dilemma, we can gaze in either of two directions: either God maintains his
consistent omnipotence by bereaving finite spirits from being causal agents over their bodies at
all times, or, He stifles his omnipotence by submitting Himself to the will of finite spirits in some
cases. The first horn of the quandary can be brushed to the side straight away. Berkeley claims
that we do move our bodies; this clearly suggests that there are in fact instances when we are
causally efficacious. As such, only the latter horn remains. Though we could say that in those
instances where God yields to the will of finite spirits, He does so because He wills it — maybe
out of his beneficent nature, He is nevertheless subservient in those very cases in virtue of the
simple fact that he must, out of causal necessitation, respond to our wills in a specific way. If we
are sometimes causally efficacious in our volitions to move, God puts a damper on His own
power. It is highly improbable that Berkeley would be pleased with the news that God is not
always omnipotent.
Lastly, it might be insisted that God could very well change the laws of nature such that
the effects of our volitions do not, necessarily, have to follow. After all, Berkeley does write that
By a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general
laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena, I do not say demonstrate, for
all the deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature always
operates uniformly...45
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This supposition, so I take it, is one that is misled according to Berkeley; for God “can
indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of his will.”46 Taken in tandem with the
prior passage, it seems evident that God certainly does have the capacity to change the laws of
nature such that the effects of our volitions do not have to follow. If He were to change the laws
in this way, there is no sense left in which God must answer to our volitions to move.
By doing so, however, the second conjunct in the consequent of conditional (1) falls
apart, thereby destroying the entire conditional. If God were to change the laws of nature such
that our volitions to move could not be in accord with them — to the extent that He would not
have to actively assist us in producing bodily motions in our mind, we could not be considered
causally efficacious in our volitions. This objection therefore fails in the very same way that the
previous one did. Beyond this, Berkeley tells us that without the law of nature, as we observe
them to be so settled, “we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more
know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born,”47 and earlier, that the
laws of nature we observe “testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author.”48 If God were to
suddenly change the laws of nature to the extent that our volitions would not be efficacious, we
might rightfully call into question God’s benevolence; would God will that His creatures become
uncertain and confused? I suspect Berkeley would surely say no. At this point, we would be
forced to either catch ourselves on the snares of Berkeley’s theological commitments (insofar as
God’s omnipotence or His benevolence is undermined), or fall into the rift separating the
integrity of the involuntariness principle from the efficacy of finite spirits’ volitions to move our
bodies.
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Section Three: Attempted Reconfigurations
One might be compelled to try and reconfigure our understanding of what Berkeley really
means when he says that we move our bodies ourselves. Previously, I have suggested that the
proper understanding entails the idea that our bodies are conglomerates of real, sensible ideas.49
Frankly, I have no conception whatsoever of what else our bodies could be for Berkeley. Surely,
Berkeley is not claiming that we move our bodies ourselves in our imagination — that is, that we
move our imaginary bodies ourselves. Naturally, and as evidenced by his explication of the
activity and agency we have over the ideas in our minds, we can move our imaginary ideas in
our minds in any way we please. If this is what he had meant, he would have said so. Reading
Berkeley’s claims about the agency we have over our own bodies in this way entirely misses the
point we are after: whether or not our agency extends into the real world. It seems to me that
reading all of Berkeley’s claims about the motions of our bodies to be manifest only in our
imagination is effectually a massive misinterpretation, and as such, ought not to be taken
seriously. If the object that we are moving is neither a chimerical idea of imagination nor a real
sensible idea, what else could it be?
In Berkeley’s ontology — baring spirits — there are only ideas of imagination, and real
ideas of sensation. As I have shown, reducing Berkeley’s claims about the motions of our bodies
to ideas of imagination is both a misreading, and, if we were to hypothetically read him in this
way, it still says nothing about the type of agency we are after.
Another path that may be trod in order to reconcile conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) might
consist in taking the motion alone of our sensibly perceived bodies to be attributable to finite
spirits such that the rest of the ideas that compose whatever object is in motion to be attributable
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to God. In adopting this picture, one might say that I am responsible for the motion of my arm
that is otherwise authored by God. One might speculate whether moving our legs––which, as we
have found, are identified as real things––is the same as being the voluntary author of our ideas
of legs. To frame this thought in the form of a question, one may ask: is the activity of moving
our legs identical to voluntarily creating the ideas of moving legs? If one were to press on this
point, they might call upon the following passage in De Motu:
we have learned from our own experience that there is a power of moving bodies in
[thinking things], since our mind may at will initiate or stop the movement of our limbs,
however that is eventually explained. It is certainly established that bodies are moved at
the command of the mind, and that the latter can be called appropriately a principle of
motion––a specific and subordinate principle indeed, which itself depends on the first and
universal principle.50

Here, Berkeley clearly claims that we as finite spirits have the capacity to move our bodies at the
command of the mind, and that the mind’s activity can appropriately dubbed a principle of
motion. This might be construed as prima facie reason to believe that it is the motion of moving
bodies that finite spirits are causally responsible for. What we are to make of the claim that the
mind’s activity is a subordinate principle with respect to the “first and universal principle,” God,
requires a bit of assiduity. So far as I take it, Berkeley’s meaning is that the efficacy of our
mind’s volition to move is dependent upon God. Without God, our volition to move would be
impotent.
On first impression, it may seem as though that moving our legs and being the author of
moving legs are two wholly separate activities.51 But, once we consider the fact that Berkeley
claims that motions, just like all other sensible qualities, cannot be abstracted away from their
particular instances, it becomes clear that being the author of particular motions cannot be
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De Motu 25. Emphasis added. The “first and universal principle” being God.
That is, willing the motion of our bodies and creating the set of sensible ideas that constitute a moving limb.
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abstracted from being the author of the particular sensible thing itself. For Berkeley, our bodies
do not differ in their causal makeup from other real things, and that part of what constitutes a
moving body is its particular, non-abstractable motion. It certainly seems pretty bizarre to claim
that we, as finite spirits, are the authors of one particular non-abstractable sensible idea that
partially constitutes a sensible thing that is otherwise authored by God. Given that real motion is
necessarily bound to real ideas, it too must be authored by God; otherwise, one who argues in
this line would be breaching the involuntariness principle, (i).

Conclusion
By way of a thoroughgoing exegetical analysis of Berkeley’s claims in his writings, three
necessary conditions have been uncovered that must be satisfied in any attempt to plausibly
attribute Berkeley a consistent and coherent account of non-divine agency in the real world.
After examining the variety of interpretive paths that one may walk down in attempting to cash
out Berkeley’s views concerning the relationship between the activity of spirits and the perceived
motions of our bodies, I have shown that while the occasionalist model escapes the grips of the
author of sin problem and inconsistencies with Berkeley’s immaterialist ontology, it does not
remove itself far enough from conflicting with condition (ii). I have illustrated that the prevailing
occasionalist model endorsed by Pitcher and Lee (which effectively bars finite spirits from the
capacity to be individually efficacious agents by way of our wills being entirely causally inert),
ought not be considered a successful interpretation given that it cannot adequately account for
Berkeley’s repeated profession that finite spirits do produce the motions of our bodies. In
addition, it forces us to concede that our senses deceive us in one of our most basic, common
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sense beliefs: that we do in fact cause our bodies to move. This engenders the threat of
skepticism that Berkeley vigilantly tried to combat.
Given the pernicious character of these consequences, I have constructed a possible
reconciliation of conditions (i) and (ii) that takes both finite spirits and God to be genuine causal
forces in the production of sensible bodily motions. When applied to Berkeley’s views about the
causality of finite spirits, the attempted reconciliation failed by way of turning condition (iii) on
its head; God’s omnipotence was undermined by making it necessary that he responds to the will
of causally efficacious finite spirits.
I have addressed two other possible attempts to reconcile Berkeley’s commitments to (i),
(ii), and (iii) that I take to be the only remaining options for acquitting Berkeley’s views about
non-divine causation from inconsistency. Trying to reconstrue Berkeley’s meaning of ‘body’
when referencing that which it is we move had proven to be impossible in his schema: if
Berkeley had meant that we move our imaginary bodies, we are left empty handed concerning
our agency in the real world, and if he meant something other than real, sensible ideas, he would
have been stepping outside of his immaterialist constituents. The last remaining avenue of
exculpating Berkeley’s views about non-divine agency in the real world consisted in taking the
motion alone of our sensibly perceived moving bodies to be under our causal control. Because
motion itself cannot be abstracted away from the other ideas that constitute a real body, it too
must be authored by God exclusively.
Berkeley tells us in the introduction of the Principles that when reading his words, we are
entreated to make his words the occasions of our own thinking, and that we would do well to
attain the same train of thoughts in reading that he had in writing them. His words, as he
implores, will not be marks of deception so long as we understand them by way of our own
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naked, undisguised ideas.52 When we are told that the motions of our bodies are consequent upon
our volitions, a rather lucid idea is thrust upon my mind: I am a true cause of the motion of my
body I perceive when I will it to move. When we are told that we cannot cause any states of
affairs that we perceive via sense, another idea becomes manifest: I am not the cause of the
motion of my body that I perceive when I will it to move. These ideas considered together, as I
have argued, bar Berkeley from being understood as holding a coherent and consistent account
of non-divine agency in the real world upon considered interpretations, reconstructions, and
reconciliations that I see as exhaustive.

52
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